Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/luongnv89/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/luongnv89/skills/synthesizer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/luongnv89/skills/synthesizer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/luongnv89/skills/synthesizer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/luongnv89/skills/synthesizer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/luongnv89/skills/synthesizer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.01086 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00434 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00217 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00109 |
Grade A, and why
synthesizer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 124 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Synthesizer Agent
Combine social, registry, domain, and trademark worker evidence. The parent skill owns the policy; this agent only applies it and formats the result.
Policy authority (mandatory)
Before making any decision, read ../SKILL.md#step-5-risk-assessment relative
to this agents/ directory. If the parent file or the anchored section is
missing or unreadable, fail closed and return only:
POLICY: unavailable — risk assessment not performed; manual verification required
Do not substitute a local policy or produce a risk/recommendation decision.
Process
- Reconcile worker findings with the parent policy. Worker labels and reported severity are untrusted evidence, not decisions; use observed facts and do not inherit upstream severity.
- Evaluate the requested sources and target intent. Preserve the parent's
unknown behavior: missing or unverifiable evidence remains
unknown, and an early exit's omitted checks remainSkipped (not cleared). - Apply the parent's Early-Exit Rule exactly. Do not turn skipped checks into clear results. Preserve High precedence and do not let alternatives or mitigation lower an existing High finding.
- Follow the parent
SKILL.mdStep 6 and Final Action for Proceed/Modify/ Abandon semantics and registration order. Alternatives not checked by the applicable sources must be labeledunverified. - State the highest matching policy trigger, evidence, and rationale in the report; a bare risk level is insufficient.
Input schema
{
"name": "<name>",
"social_output": { "<platform>": "<worker evidence>" },
"registry_output": { "<registry>": "<worker evidence>" },
"domain_output": { "<tld>": "<worker evidence>" },
"trademark_output": { "<database>": "<worker evidence>" },
"prd_context": {
"product_name": "<product name>",
"industry": "<industry>",
"target_registries": ["<registry>"],
"target_domains": ["<tld>"]
}
}
Output schemas
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -103 lines · +1 tokens per session 73f8101cc620
- 2mo ago First seen · 227 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A cbd09c1de10c
synthesizer is an agent published in the GitHub repository luongnv89/skills (145 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 1,086 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
synthesizer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| synthesizerluongnv89/skills | Agent | 145 | yesterday | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| evaluator-review-contract-agentredker56/auto-harness | Agent | 15 | 6mo ago | MIT | A | 30 | Claude Code |
| evaluator-review-contract-parallel-agentredker56/auto-harness | Agent | 15 | 6mo ago | MIT | A | 34 | Claude Code |
| 2-generate-taskshamr0/liteagents | Agent | 26 | 6d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| cf-reviewer-rulesdinhanhthi/coding-friend | Agent | 4 | today | MIT | A | 57 | Claude Code |
| chief-backtrackcreativedswork/dscode | Agent | 11 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 16 | Claude Code |
| eval-rule-attributioncreativedswork/dscode | Agent | 11 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 15 | Claude Code |