Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Tenon-Net/TenonAdminWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/tenon-net/tenonadmin/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/tenon-net/tenonadmin/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/tenon-net/tenonadmin/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/tenon-net/tenonadmin/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/tenon-net/tenonadmin/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00016 | $0.00530 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00212 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00106 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00053 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
<review_focus> Evaluate every applicable OWASP category: A01 Broken Access Control; A02 Cryptographic Failures; A03 Injection; A04 Insecure Design; A05 Security Misconfiguration; A06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components; A07 Identification and Authentication Failures; A08 Software and Data Integrity Failures; A09 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures; and A10 Server-Side Request Forgery.
Always inspect API endpoints, trust boundaries, authentication and authorization, user-controlled input, database queries, file operations/uploads, serialization, dependency versions, and error or logging paths. Scan relevant files and history for hardcoded API keys, passwords, secrets, and tokens. Run the applicable dependency audit. </review_focus>
<severity_and_evidence>
- Prioritize findings by severity × exploitability × blast radius and state an overall HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW risk level.
- Confirm the vulnerable path and cite
file:line; do not escalate a speculative pattern without evidence of reachability or impact. - Every finding includes category, severity, exploitability, blast radius, issue, and remediation with a secure example in the vulnerable language.
- Check secrets and dependencies explicitly even when no application vulnerability is found. </severity_and_evidence>
<output_contract>
Security Review Report
Scope: [files/components reviewed] Risk Level: HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW
Summary
- Critical Issues: X
- High Issues: Y
- Medium Issues: Z
Critical Issues (Fix Immediately)
1. [Issue Title]
Severity: CRITICAL
Category: [OWASP category]
Location: file.ts:123
Exploitability: [Remote/Local, authenticated/unauthenticated]
Blast Radius: [What an attacker gains]
Issue: [Description]
Remediation:
// BAD
[vulnerable code]
// GOOD
[secure code]
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 58 lines · 16 tokens per session scan A a6ab30fd2637
security-reviewer is a command published in the GitHub repository Tenon-Net/TenonAdmin (41 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 16 tokens to every session and 530 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-11-07.
security-reviewer compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| security-reviewerTenon-Net/TenonAdmin | Command | 41 | 14d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 16 | Claude Code, Codex |
| indexxberg-io/crawlberg | Command | 195 | yesterday | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code |
| dotnet-teachmathisk2095/jko-claude-plugins | Command | 3 | 24d ago | MIT | A | 29 | Claude Code |
| dotnet-structuremathisk2095/jko-claude-plugins | Command | 3 | 24d ago | MIT | A | 24 | Claude Code |
| code-simplifypeterblazejewicz/claude-plugins | Command | 8 | 4mo ago | MIT | A | 16 | Claude Code |
| dotnet-code-reviewwgdotnet/awesome-claude-code | Command | 5 | 6mo ago | none | B | 0 | Claude Code |
| checklistgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |