Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/0dayinc/pwn/deep-exploitationnpx skills add 0dayInc/pwn --skill deep-exploitationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0dayInc/pwnWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/0dayinc/pwn/deep-exploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/0dayinc/pwn/deep-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/0dayinc/pwn/deep-exploitation.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00729 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00365 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00146 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00073 |
Grade A, and why
deep-exploitation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Deep Exploitation
Use when a bug already has a crash, a primitive, or a clear memory/logic flaw and the ask is a reliable PoC - not a first recon pass.
When to use
- crash triage, heap/stack corruption, UAF, format string, type confusion
- ASLR / NX / canary / CFG / SMEP bypass planning
- kernel, browser, or protocol exploit chains after the root cause is known
Methodologies
- CWE classes: CWE-119, CWE-416, CWE-787, CWE-134, CWE-190
- MITRE ATT&CK: Execution, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
- NIST SP 800-115: exploitation and evidence sections of a technical test
- Hand off firmware blobs to
hardware-and-firmware-testing(OWASP FSTM)
Tooling
- Debug: gdb + pwndbg/GEF,
radare2, Ghidra/IDA as available. - Inspect:
checksec,readelf,objdump,PWN::Plugins::Assembly. - Gadgets: ROPgadget / ropper.
- Fuzz to feed this skill:
PWN::Plugins::Fuzz, AFL++, libFuzzer. - Web follow-on: Burp over ZAP;
PWN::Plugins::BeEFonly if hooks are in scope of the ask. - Post-proof:
PWN::Plugins::Metasploitonly when the operator asked for a module/session, not as the default payload.
Procedure
- Reproduce. One command or one
pwn_evalsnippet that crashes or misbehaves every time. - Name the flaw (overflow, UAF, integer wrap, type confusion, race).
- Map mitigations (
checksec,/proc/cpuinfoSMEP/SMAP, CFG). - Build primitives in order: leak, arbitrary read, arbitrary write, control of a function pointer / GOT / vtable / return.
- Chain (ROP/JOP/SROP or logic) until controlled execution or the asked impact (file read, auth bypass, etc.).
- Stabilize across two runs. Document bad bytes, versions, and the fix.
Patterns
- Heap overflow -> metadata / tcache -> write -> ROP
- UAF -> type confusion -> leak -> function-pointer write
- Format string ->
%pleak +%nwrite -> GOT - Kernel race -> cred / tty struct -> root
Pitfalls
- Do not skip reproduction. A narrative ROP chain is not a PoC.
- Keep the PoC small and reversible. No persistence unless asked.
memory_rememberis not the exploit file. Write the artefact, then read it back.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 75 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 6861d67e803e
deep-exploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository 0dayInc/pwn (78 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 729 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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