Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling --skill explore-exposuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-toolingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling/explore-exposure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling/explore-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling/explore-exposure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling/explore-exposure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling/explore-exposure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00199 | $0.02210 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00080 | $0.00884 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.00442 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00221 |
Grade A, and why
explore-exposure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 15d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 61 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Explore Exposure (by product or component)
Given a product/technology or a component, show its CoSAI Risk Map exposure — the controls that apply to it and the risks those controls address — and, when it's a curated two-part lexicon row, the exposure of the components it protects too (the exposure via candidates). Read-only.
Key structural fact: risks do not reference components directly. Exposure flows component → the controls that apply to it (a control's components field) → the risks those controls address (the control's risks field). Make that indirection explicit to the reader.
Audience and voice
Security architects/engineers. Explain framework terms (component, how controls/risks connect); link every entity id. When you map a product to a component, say why.
How to answer
-
Resolve to component(s).
- If the input is a component (id or name), use it directly.
- If it's a product/technology (AWS Nitro, LangChain, Pinecone, an MCP server…), map it to the component(s) it implements or protects using
references/product-component-lexicon.md(curated). (Explain: components are the framework's architectural building blocks — the loci where risks and controls attach.) - Hybrid — if the product isn't in the lexicon: reason about the role it plays, optionally confirm with a live web lookup, and map it to the nearest component(s) — but flag it as an inferred mapping, not a curated one. Do not present inference as corpus fact.
-
State the component's own applying controls — no walk. "Applying controls" means controls in
risk-map/yaml/controls.yamlwhosecomponentslist contains the component's id. Grep for it. This is a measured statement about the current corpus: some components have none today. If there are none, say so plainly — never invent one, and never borrow another component's controls to fill the gap. A component'sedgescarry no exposure semantics, whatever the edge kind: ADR-018 D3 definesedgesonly as a structured-reference field the schema/validator check for membership and bidirectional consistency, not as an "applies to" relation; and even where an edge is a containment relationship rather than data flow — ADR-030 D9 typescomponentIsolationRuntime → componentToolHosting/componentRuntimeHostingas containment, not data flow — the contained workload's controls are still not the containing component's own. You may name a neighbour, by any edge kind, as a place to explore next, without listing its controls.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 15d ago First seen · 61 lines · 199 tokens per session scan A 101b060b1984
explore-exposure is a skill published in the GitHub repository cosai-oasis/secure-ai-tooling (100 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 199 tokens to every session and 2,210 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-01.
Other skills, from other repositories
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Path traversal / Local File Inclusion detection→file-read→RCE for web apps. Use when a param names a file/path/page/template/lang/download, or a response embeds file contents. Triggers - file=/page=/path=/template=/lang=/download=/include= param, ../, %2e%2e, "no such file", directory listing, download endpoint.
web-sqli
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