forge-extension

forge-extension is a skill for Claude Code from ForgeyClap/claude-forge. It costs 0 tokens per session (1,291 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A development playbook for Chrome and Edge browser extensions using Manifest V3, the current extension format.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to build or review extension manifests, service workers, content scripts, messaging, permissions, content-security policy and Web Store readiness.
Why use it?
It guides permission, security and policy decisions that affect whether an extension is safe and acceptable for the Web Store.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: installed under .claude/. Also seen: mentions Codex.

Good fit Use it to build or review extension manifests, service workers, content scripts, messaging, permissions, content-security policy and Web Store readiness.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add ForgeyClap/claude-forge --skill forge-extension
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ForgeyClap/claude-forge

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for forge-extension

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for forge-extension

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/forgeyclap/claude-forge/forge-extension.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 0 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,291 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00000 $0.01291
Opus 5.5 $0.00000 $0.00516
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00000 $0.00258
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00129

Measured 20d ago against content hash d9e4bc0c4351, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

forge-extension scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 20d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/forge-extension/SKILL.md · 40 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 40 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Forge playbook — Browser extension (Chrome MV3)

build-boss leads; security-boss co-owns the permission + messaging + CSP surface (this is a security-heavy domain and a real Codex/security trigger). Popup/options UI defers to forge-website (real content, responsive, a11y); anything that calls a backend defers to forge-integration. Scope is Chrome/Edge Manifest V3 unless the owner asks for Firefox/Safari (those are separate ports). The honesty rule: an extension that "loads unpacked" must have its core flow actually exercised, and every permission requested must be one the code genuinely uses.

Hard rules (non-negotiable)

  • Least-privilege permissions. Request only the permissions + host_permissions the code actually uses; prefer activeTab and optional_permissions over a blanket <all_urls>. Each permission is justifiable in one sentence. Over-broad scope is both a Web Store rejection risk and a user-trust failure.
  • No remotely-hosted code (MV3 policy). All executable JS ships inside the package — no eval, new Function on remote strings, or <script src> from a CDN. Remote code is a hard Chrome Web Store rejection.
  • Safe content-script + messaging. Content scripts run in the page's hostile context: validate every chrome.runtime.onMessage payload and check sender; never trust or eval window.postMessage data from the page; keep externally_connectable narrow. web_accessible_resources scoped to specific matches, never <all_urls>.
  • Strict CSP kept strict. MV3's default extension CSP (script-src 'self') is not weakened — no 'unsafe-eval', no 'unsafe-inline', no remote script sources. Sandboxed pages only if genuinely required, narrowly.
  • Termination-resilient service worker. The MV3 background is an event-driven service worker, not a persistent page: listeners registered at top level, no reliance on in-memory global state surviving, durable state persisted to chrome.storage.
  • No secrets in the package; store-policy compliance. No API secret baked into the extension (it's extractable); real secrets sit behind a backend, OAuth via chrome.identity with minimal scopes. Single clear purpose, accurate description, privacy disclosure if user data is handled, no obfuscated code.

Read the full file on GitHub · 40 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 20d ago Changed · -41 tokens per session d9e4bc0c4351
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 40 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 657f0fdd529f

Subscribe to this mod's changes

forge-extension is a skill published in the GitHub repository ForgeyClap/claude-forge (2 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,291 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.