Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system/main/.claude/skills/lemlist-campaign-from-icp/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-systemWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/lemlist-campaign-from-icp)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/lemlist-campaign-from-icp"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/lemlist-campaign-from-icp/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/lemlist-campaign-from-icp"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/lemlist-campaign-from-icp.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Agent Snooping · line 3 Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that read MCP configuration files (mcp.json). MCP server details should be managed by the agent runtime, not read by individual skills.
- high Agent Snooping · line 11 Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that read MCP configuration files (mcp.json). MCP server details should be managed by the agent runtime, not read by individual skills.
- high Agent Snooping · line 258 Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that read MCP configuration files (mcp.json). MCP server details should be managed by the agent runtime, not read by individual skills.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 3 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 32 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 144 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 237 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00251 | $0.06652 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00125 | $0.03326 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00050 | $0.01330 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00665 |
Grade A, and why
lemlist-campaign-from-icp scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 266 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Lemlist Campaign From ICP
Turn a natural-language ICP prompt into a paused live lemlist campaign — leads sourced from lemlist's People Database, agentically enriched, routed by seniority, sequenced, refined, scored against the 244K-campaign benchmark, and pushed into a real lemlist account in PAUSED state for human review.
The user types one prompt. The skill chains 24 lemlist atomic skills + the lemlist MCP server. Approval gates fire before the campaign is created in lemlist. Nothing auto-sends.
When This Skill Applies
- "create a lemlist campaign for VPs of Sales at Series B SaaS hiring AEs in Europe"
- "build a lemlist campaign from this ICP: …"
- "spin a lemlist campaign for managers in HR Tech using paid LinkedIn jobs"
- "ICP to lemlist"
- "natural language to lemlist campaign"
- "draft a lemlist campaign for me"
Prerequisites
LEMLIST_API_KEY= # https://app.lemlist.com → Settings → Integrations
OAuth alternative (interactive use): claude mcp add --transport http lemlist https://app.lemlist.com/mcp.
The lemlist MCP must be connected. Verify with /mcp in Claude Code — you should see operations like get_lemleads_filters, lemleads_search, create_campaign_with_sequence, add_sequence_step, add_lead_to_campaign, set_campaign_state, validate_campaign_readiness, campaign stats, etc.
This skill depends on the 24 atomic lemlist skills bundled under .claude/skills/lemlist/. They were imported from lemlist's open-source skill library under MIT. See .claude/skills/lemlist/README.md for the attribution and update procedure.
Hard safety contract (MANDATORY)
This skill creates a campaign in a real lemlist account using paid lemlist credits (sourcing + agentic enrichment). It must never auto-send. Safeguards:
- DRAFT state is the default. Campaigns are created in DRAFT state by default via
create_campaign_with_sequence. The orchestrator MUST NOT callset_campaign_statewith actionstart. Verify withvalidate_campaign_readinessbefore reporting readiness to the user. The campaign stays in DRAFT in the user's lemlist account until the user starts it manually in the lemlist UI. - Dryrun first. Render the full sequence text, the lead list summary, the persona routing breakdown, and the estimated lemlist credit usage to a local JSON file at
~/.gtm-os/lemlist-campaign-from-icp/dryrun-{timestamp}.json. Quote the file path back to the user. - Lead count ceiling. Default cap is 50 leads per run. The user can raise it with an explicit instruction, but the skill always quotes the number back before sourcing.
- Hard approval prompt. After the dryrun, the skill asks
"Approve creating campaign '{title}' in lemlist with {N} leads and the sequence above? Type 'approve' to push, anything else to abort."Block on the user response. Do not call any campaign-creation or lead-add MCP tool until the user typesapprove. - No silent retries. If any MCP creation/add call fails, surface the error and stop. Do not retry without explicit user instruction. Known unstable endpoint (verified live, 2026-05-19):
set_campaign_stateactionarchivecan return HTTP 500 intermittently — never retry blindly; surface the error and let the user clean up via the lemlist UI.
What ships with it
9 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 266 lines · 251 tokens per session scan A 16e635c0cb03
lemlist-campaign-from-icp is a skill published in the GitHub repository Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system (301 stars, last pushed 22d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 251 tokens to every session and 6,652 once invoked, about $0.0013 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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kn-research
Use when you need to understand existing code, find patterns, search project knowledge, investigate current external facts, or explore a large codebase before implementation.
kn-debug
Use when debugging errors, test failures, build issues, or blocked tasks — structured triage to fix to learn.