offensive-jwt

offensive-jwt is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from SnailSploit/Claude-Red. It costs 97 tokens per session (2,745 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security-testing checklist for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), signed tokens commonly used to carry login and authorization data between applications.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it in authorized tests of token creation, verification, algorithms, keys, headers, expiration handling, storage, and mobile applications.
Why use it?
It helps identify weak signing, unsafe header handling, token tampering, exposed data, and other mistakes that may let attackers bypass access controls.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT","kid":"../../../../dev/null"}.

Good fit Use it in authorized tests of token creation, verification, algorithms, keys, headers, expiration handling, storage, and mobile applications.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
About the project

claude-red is a library of structured skills that give Claude specialized offensive-security methods for areas such as web vulnerabilities, shellcode, exploit development, and identity systems. It is intended for authorized red-team work, bug-bounty triage, security research, CTF preparation, and operator training. Its catalogue contains the project's skills for loading these security specializations into Claude.

SnailSploit/Claude-Red · 7,620 stars · on GitHub

Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for offensive-jwt

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for offensive-jwt

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-jwt.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 97 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,745 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • high YARA Match · line 46
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 138
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 258
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 268
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium Tool Misuse · line 110
    Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
    Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 122
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Rogue Agent · line 130
    Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
    Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 142
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 142
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 145
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 173
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 174
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
  • medium Data Exfiltration · line 175
    Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00097 $0.02745
Opus 5.5 $0.00039 $0.01098
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00019 $0.00549
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00275

Measured 1mo ago against content hash f4062ca66c12, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

offensive-jwt scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <api_key>" https://api.target/resource
Origin

Copies of this mod

1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:

Skills/auth/offensive-jwt/SKILL.md · 275 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 275 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Overview

Comprehensive JWT attack checklist for offensive security engagements. Follow steps in order; apply each technique to the current target context and track which items have been completed.

Quick Reference: Misconfigurations to Check

  • Algorithm set to none — signature verification bypassed entirely
  • Algorithm switching between RSA and HMAC (confusion attack)
  • Weak or guessable HMAC secret (brute-forceable)
  • kid, jku, jwk, x5u header parameters accepted without validation
  • Expired or tampered tokens accepted by server
  • Sensitive data stored unencrypted in payload

Useful tool: JWT Tool

Mechanisms

JWTs (RFC 7519) consist of three Base64URL-encoded parts: header.payload.signature.

Signing algorithms:

Algorithm Type Notes
HS256/384/512 Symmetric HMAC Shared secret; confusion target
RS256/384/512 Asymmetric RSA Public key can be misused as HMAC secret
ES256/384/512 Asymmetric ECDSA
PS256/384/512 RSASSA-PSS
EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) Asymmetric
none Unsigned Critically insecure

Additional pitfalls:

  • JWS/JWE confusion: server accepts encrypted token (JWE) where signed (JWS) is expected, or fails open on unexpected typ/cty
  • JWKS retrieval: SSRF via jku/x5u, insecure TLS, poisoned key caching, kid collisions
  • Token binding (DPoP, mTLS): incorrectly implemented allows replay from other clients

Hunt: Identifying JWT Usage

  1. Check Authorization: Bearer <token> headers in all requests
  2. Look for cookies containing JWT structures (eyJ...)
  3. Examine browser local/session storage
  4. Decode the token at jwt.io or via BurpSuite JWT extension — inspect claims and header parameters
  5. Note any kid, jku, jwk, x5u fields in the header — these are attack surfaces

Vulnerability Map

JWT Vulnerabilities
├── Algorithm Bypass
│   ├── alg:none attack
│   └── RS256→HS256 confusion (public key as HMAC secret)
├── Weak Secret Key → Brute force
├── kid Parameter Injection
│   ├── SQL injection via kid
│   └── Path traversal via kid
├── Header Injection
│   ├── jwk (inline fake key)
│   ├── jku/x5u (remote attacker-controlled JWKS)
│   └── JWKS cache poisoning
└── Missing / Broken Validation
    ├── No signature check
    ├── Expired tokens accepted
    └── iss/aud/exp not validated

Read the full file on GitHub · 275 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 275 lines · 97 tokens per session scan A f4062ca66c12

Subscribe to this mod's changes

offensive-jwt is a skill published in the GitHub repository SnailSploit/Claude-Red (7,620 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 2,745 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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