Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cache-attacknpx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill cache-attackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cache-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cache-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/cache-attack.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00018 | $0.03062 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00009 | $0.01531 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00612 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00306 |
Grade A, and why
cache-attack scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 281 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cache Attack Skill
Web Cache Poisoning (WCP) and Web Cache Deception (WCD) methodology. WCP poisons cached pages with malicious content served to other users. WCD tricks the cache into storing sensitive pages that the attacker can then read. Both techniques exploit CDN and reverse-proxy caching behavior on CloudFront, Cloudflare, Fastly, Varnish, and Nginx.
When to Use
- Target uses a CDN (CloudFront, Cloudflare, Fastly) or reverse proxy (Varnish, Nginx cache).
- Headers show
X-Cache,Age,cf-cache-status, orX-Cache-Hits. - After surface recon finds no direct vulnerabilities — pivot to infrastructure layer.
- Target allows file extension manipulation in URL paths (.css, .json, .js).
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl.- Cache buster parameter for safe testing (
?cb=RANDOM). - Patience: cache poisoning requires precise timing and may need multiple attempts.
How to Run
# Phase 1: Detect cache
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/" | grep -iE "age|x-cache|cf-cache-status|via|server"
# Phase 2: Test cache storage (two identical requests)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/?cb=TEST1" | grep -iE "x-cache|cf-cache-status"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/?cb=TEST1" | grep -iE "x-cache|cf-cache-status"
# Second response should show HIT if caching works
# Phase 3: Test unkeyed header reflection
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" | grep -i "location\|evil.com"
Quick Reference
Web Cache Poisoning (WCP) — attacker poisons cache for victims
| Reflection Location | Impact | Severity |
|---|---|---|
<link rel="canonical"> |
SEO poisoning | Medium |
<script src="..."> |
XSS (stored in cache) | Critical |
<meta property="og:url"> |
Phishing (link preview) | High |
Location: header |
Mass open redirect | High |
<form action="..."> |
Credential theft | High |
<link rel="stylesheet"> |
CSS injection | Medium |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 281 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A 769b8192c891
cache-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,225 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 3,062 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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