Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill google-dorks-cataloggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/google-dorks-catalog)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/google-dorks-catalog"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/google-dorks-catalog/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/google-dorks-catalog"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/google-dorks-catalog.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 33 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 37 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 156 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 129 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 116 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 111 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.01216 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00486 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00243 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00122 |
Grade A, and why
google-dorks-catalog scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/.env" | head -5 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 160 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Google Dorks Catalog -- Exposed Configs & Secrets
When to Use
- During passive reconnaissance (Phase 1) on every target
- After crt.sh subdomain enumeration
- Before any active scanning
- Validated against 100+ real targets
High-Precision Dorks
Critical Exposed Files
site:$target "APP_KEY"
site:$target "DB_PASSWORD"
site:$target "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
site:$target filetype:env
site:$target inurl:git/config
site:$target intitle:"index of" ".env"
site:$target "api_key" OR "apikey" OR "secret_key"
site:$target "firebase" "apiKey"
site:$target "supabase" "anon" "key"
site:$target inurl:"/.env" "DB_PASSWORD"
site:$target "client_secret" "redirect_uris" extension:json
site:$target "private_key" "client_email" extension:json
Exposed Configuration Files (ALL Extensions)
site:$target ext:log | ext:txt | ext:conf | ext:cnf | ext:ini | ext:env | ext:sh | ext:bak | ext:backup | ext:swp | ext:old | ext:~ | ext:git | ext:svn | ext:htpasswd | ext:htaccess | ext:json
This covers:
- logs -- tokens, SQL queries, emails in plain text
- txt/conf/cnf/ini -- server configurations, DB hosts
- env -- environment variables with credentials
- sh -- scripts with hardcoded passwords
- bak/backup/swp/old/~ -- backup files with old versions
- git/svn -- exposed versioned repositories
- htpasswd/htaccess -- access control with hashes
- json -- service accounts, Firebase configs, Supabase configs
Service-Specific Dorks
Supabase
site:$target "supabase.co" "anon_key" OR "SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"
Firebase
site:$target "firebase-adminsdk" "private_key_id" extension:json
AWS
site:$target "AKIA" filetype:env NOT example NOT test
SendGrid
site:$target "SG." filetype:env NOT example
MongoDB
site:$target "mongodb+srv://" "password"
PostgreSQL
site:$target "postgresql://" "password" ext:env
JWT Secrets
site:$target "JWT_SECRET" OR "jwt_secret" filetype:env
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 160 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A 2ee9774da8cd
google-dorks-catalog is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,317 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 1,216 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
conducting-external-reconnaissance-with-osint
Conducts external reconnaissance using Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) techniques to map an organization's external attack surface without directly interacting with target systems. The tester gathers information from public sources including DNS records, certificate transparency logs, search engines, social media…
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-cloud-dlp-for-data-protection
Implementing Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) using Amazon Macie, Azure Information Protection, and Google Cloud DLP API to discover, classify, and protect sensitive data across cloud storage, databases, and data pipelines.
implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis
Implementing AWS CloudTrail log analysis for security monitoring, threat detection, and forensic investigation using Athena, CloudWatch Logs Insights, and SIEM integration to identify unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious API activity.
implementing-zero-trust-network-access
Implementing Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) in cloud environments by configuring identity-aware proxies, micro-segmentation, continuous verification with conditional access policies, and replacing traditional VPN-based access with BeyondCorp-style architectures across AWS, Azure, and GCP.